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I. INTRODUCTION
In the years from 1969 to 1978 the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws ("Conference") engaged in a massive project,
the drafting of uniform laws covering the selling of, and creation of security
interests in, real estate, and most of the public record and priority aspects of
real estate conveyancing. The initial result of that project was three acts:
* Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
A.B., 1953, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; LL.B., 1959, Wake Forest University;
LL.M., 1965, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Professor Benfield was Commissioner
from Illinois to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws from
1973-1990 and from North Carolina since 1990. He was also co-reporter for the Uniform
Land Transactions Act and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act 1970-1977.
The author thanks Normak Klick, Jr., who provided research assistance for the article.
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the Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA"),' the Uniform Simplification
of Land Transfers Act ("USLTA"), 2 and the Uniform Condominium Act
("UCA"). 3 The ULTA covers sales and the creation of security interests.
The USLTA covers various aspects of the conveyancing system including
formal requisites for land transfers, recording and priority rules, marketable
title, mechanics liens, and provisions concerning the operation of the
recording office. Later, in the face of massive indifference of legislatures
to the ULTA and the USLTA, the Conference separated from the ULTA the
part on security interests and promulgated it, with some changes, as the
Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"), 4 and separated from
USLTA the mechanics lien provisions as the Uniform Construction Lien
Act,5 and the provisions on marketable title as the Uniform Marketable Title
Act.6 The Uniform Condominium Act project led to three other related
acts: the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act, 7 the Uniform Planned
Community Act,8 and the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.9
After promulgation of the three original acts, the Conference and the
American Bar Association established the Joint Editorial Board for the
Uniform Real Property Acts ("Board"). The Board is now composed of
members from the Conference, the American Bar Association, and the
American College of Real Estate Lawyers. The Board was largely
responsible for the promulgation of Article 3 of the ULTA as the Uniform
Land Security Interest Act and of Article 5 of the USLTA as the Uniform
Construction Lien Act ("UCLA"). 0 With the exception of the UCLA and
related acts which have been adopted in a total of fourteen states,' the
1. 13 U.L.A. 469 (1975) (amended 1977).
2. 14 U.L.A. 249 (1975) (amended 1977).
3. 7 U.L.A. 421 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
4. 7A U.L.A. 220 (1985 & Supp. 1995).
5. 7 U.L.A. 330 (1987 & Supp. 1995).
6. 13 U.L.A. 112 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
7. 7B U.L.A. 225 (1981).
8. 7B U.L.A. 1 (1980).
9. 7 U.L.A. 231 (1982) (current version at 7 U.L.A. 171 (1994 & Supp. 1995)).
10. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1995-96 REFERENCE BOOK [hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE]
(naming current members of the Joint Editorial Board).
11. These states include: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 35-8A-101 to -417 (1990); Arizona,
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1201 to -1270 (1985); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 33,
§§ 47-200 to -293 (1983); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1601-101 to 1604-118
(West 1981); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 515A.1-101 to .4-117 (1980); Missouri, MO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 448.1-101 to .4-120 (Vernon 1983); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 §§ 47-
7A-1 to -7D-20 (Michie 1982); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47C-1-101 to -4-120
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other land acts have had only one adoption, Article 5 of the USLTA
(Construction Lien Act), in Nebraska," and little legislative activity in the
other states. 3
During the years from 1970 to 1975, the participants in the process
spent a collective total of tens of thousands of hours drafting, re-drafting,
reading, and debating the acts. The result was one enactment of one spin-
off act. If the hours spent on the project had been billed at lawyers' average
hourly rates, they would have cost, no doubt, millions of dollars. That
extensive effort made a tiny impact on the law in this country. Since the
author was a major participant in the process and a disproportionate number
of those hours were his, it is with particular pain that he recalls those
"wasted days and wasted nights."
This article will review the background and drafting of the uniform
land acts, summarize briefly the major provisions of the ULTA and the
USLTA, and discuss the reasons for the failure of those acts, and the
separately promulgated Uniform Land Security Interest Act and Uniform
Construction Lien Act, to receive legislative acceptance. 14
II. BACKGROUND
The Conference was organized in 1892 and is composed of commis-
sioners from all the states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District
of Columbia. The commissioners are appointed by the governor or other
officials of the jurisdiction, the number of which are left to the appointing
(1986); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101-3414 (1980); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws
§§ 34-36.1-1.01 to -4.20 (1982); Texas, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001-.164 (West 1993);
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.39 to .103 (Michie 1974); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 64.34.010 to .950 (1989).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-125ff (1984). Nebraska adopted Article 5 of the USLTA
before the separate promulgation of Article 5 as the Uniform Construction Lien Act.
13. In the early 1990s the Connecticut Law Revision Commission attempted to achieve
a consensus among borrowers and lenders regarding modifications to the Uniform Land
Security Interest Act which would make it acceptable in that state. The effort failed because
of inability of lenders to agree among themselves. Interview with William Breetz, Chair of
the Connecticut Law Revision Commission, in San Antonio, Tex. (July 12, 1993). There
have also been Bar Association study committees in Illinois, New York, Minnesota, and
Oregon studying the possibility of introducing a form of the ULSIA in their states. See
Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 30
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 289, 314-17 (1995) (discussing the efforts in Illinois, Minnesota,
and New York).
14. This article will not further discuss the Uniform Condominium and related acts.
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jurisdiction. Currently, the Conference has over 300 members. 5  The
stated purpose of the Conference is to "promote uniformity in the law
among the several States on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and
practicable."' 6 The Conference strives for that goal through the drafting
of uniform or model acts which are then offered to the states for adop-
tion. 7 Since 1892, the Conference has drafted hundreds of uniform or
model acts, many of which have received widespread adoptions. 8
However, many other acts have had few or no adoptions. 9 Acts in the
areas of commercial law, judicial procedure, and interstate cooperation have
had the most success. The first product of the Conference, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, promulgated by the Conference in 1896, just
four years after the Conference was founded, was adopted in all states.2"
The Uniform Sales Act, promulgated in 1906, was adopted in thirty-two
states.2' The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), first promulgated in
1951 (but amended a number of times), has now been adopted in all states
and the District of Columbia. The Uniform Arbitration Act has been
adopted in forty-nine jurisdictions, the Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in
fifty-two jurisdictions, and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act in
forty-seven jurisdictions. There are other procedural acts with similar
records.22 On the other hand, the Conference has been least successful
15. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 6-20 (listing of present commission-
ers).
16. Id. at 56.
17. Id. at 82. An act is designated as a "uniform act" if achievement of uniformity
among the states is a principal objective and there is reason to expect adoption in a large
number of jurisdictions. An act is designated as a "model" act if uniformity is not a
principal objective, or the act may promote uniformity and minimize diversity even though
a substantial number of jurisdictions may not adopt the act in its entirety, or the purpose of
the act can be achieved, though it is not adopted in its entirety by every state. That is, the
Conference designates acts as uniform acts only if it believes that a substantial number of
states will adopt the act. However, many uniform acts have few adoptions. The reference
table of uniform acts in the 1995-96 version of the National Conference indicates that 43
uniform acts have been adopted in fewer than 10 jurisdictions, and that 10 acts have no
adoptions. Id. at 84-88.
18. l (listing all current uniform acts and states in which they have been adopted).
19. Twenty acts promulgated more than three years ago have been adopted in three or
less states, including several which have no adoptions. NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note
10, at 84-88.
20. See WILLIAM E. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 10-11 (2d
ed. 1961).
21. See LAWRENCE VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 6 n.33 (2d ed. 1959).
22. NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 84-90 (listing all acts which the
conference is still sponsoring and the states in which they are adopted).
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when it proposes uniform legislation dealing with issues which are the
subject of intense public debate and disagreement or involve strong lobbying
by opposing interests. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Ace 3 for
example, was adopted in only eight states, and the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code24 in only eleven.
IH. DECISION TO DRAFT A PARTICULAR STATUTE
The Conference process for approving drafting projects is careful and
thorough. Proposed drafting projects must be approved by two committees,
the Scope and Program Committee, and the Executive Committee. Under
the Conference rules, the Scope and Program Committee first considers
proposals for drafting projects. If it approves, the proposal is then presented
to the Executive Committee. Some drafting projects approved by the Scope
and Program Committee are rejected by the Executive Committee, either
because the Executive Committee disagrees with the Scope and Program
Committee evaluation of the proposal, or because the Conference has other
more pressing projects. 25 The committees act on proposals made either by
members of the Conference, or by groups or persons outside the Conference.
A substantial number of proposals made to the two committees are rejected.
A major criterion in deciding whether projects should be undertaken is the
likelihood that the resulting uniform law will be widely adopted.26
However, as the above review of the acceptance of conference acts indicates,
the Conference has drafted and promulgated a significant number of acts
which would not have been approved by the Scope and Program and
Executive Committees had they known the actual degree of acceptance the
acts would receive.
If a drafting project is approved, a drafting committee and a reporter
are appointed for the act. Sometimes two or three reporters (usually law
professors) serve as drafters for a drafting committee. Under Conference
procedure, the reporters to a committee prepare drafts which are thoroughly
discussed and criticized at committee meetings. The reporters then follow
the instructions of the committee in preparing additional drafts. All
members of the drafting committee must be members of the Conference.
However, the Conference makes intensive efforts to secure input from
23. 9A U.L.A. 147 (1970) (amended 1971 & 1973).
24. 7A U.L.A. 1 (1968) (amended 1974).
25. The author has personal knowledge from having been a member of both committees
in recent years.
26. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 80.
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interested groups outside the Conference. A drafting committee with seven
or so committee members will often have thirty or more observers and
advisors attending a committee meeting. Those advisors and observers will
have privileges of the floor, and often they are asked to vote on issues
before the committee, so that the committee can be advised as to the views
of those in attendance. Committees will typically meet three times a year,
for two and a half day meetings, for two or more years, before an act is
finally approved. Also, all acts have to be read line by line at two annual
meetings of the Conference before they are approved. At those readings
there is often intense debate on the floor regarding various provisions of the
act and, frequently, committee positions are rejected by the full Conference.
A. Beginning of the Land Acts Process
In the late 1960s, Allison Dunham, Professor of Law at the University
of Chicago and Executive Director of the Conference from 1963 to 1969,
proposed that the Conference undertake the drafting of a uniform land
transactions act. The Conference was celebrating its crowning achievement
and greatest success, the UCC, which by then had been adopted in fifty
jurisdictions," with only Louisiana not in the fold.28 Professor Dunham
had been, along with Grant Gilmore, the drafter of Article 9, the most
imaginative and ground-breaking article of the UCC. Professor Dunham had
for many years taught real property and mortgages courses and was author
of a casebook, Modern Real Estate Transactions.29 His dual experience as
drafter of Article 9 of the Code, and expertise in real estate transactions, led
him to believe that a national uniform law governing real estate transactions
in the way that the UCC governs sales of, and security interests in, personal
property, would encourage a national mortgage market, better protect buyers
and sellers of real estate, and modernize the law of real estate transactions.
He also believed that the UCC was a good model for a uniform law
governing real estate transactions.
In 1969, the Scope and Program and Executive Committees of the
Conference approved a proposal by Professor Dunham that a drafting
committee be appointed to prepare the Uniform Land Transactions Act.3"
27. See id.
28. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCC. See I U.L.A.
1 (1989) (table of enactments).
29. ALLISON DUNHAM, MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2d ed. 1958).
30. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 469.
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Approval was given even though the Conference had attempted earlier to
secure adoption of legislation in the real estate area without success. In the
1920s, 30s, and 40s, acts proposed by the Conference in the real property
area had met with dismal success (or lack thereof). In 1927, the Conference
proposed a Uniform Real Estate Mortgages Act which received no
adoptions.31 The Conference was so desperate to show action in the real
estate area that in the 1930s it listed Minnesota as adopting the Real Estate
Mortgages Act, though Minnesota in fact adopted only one of the forty-three
sections of the Act.32 The section Minnesota adopted set out a statutory
short-form mortgage.33 In 1932, a Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act was
proposed" and was adopted in Florida.35 Florida amended the Uniform
Act in 1953 so extensively that it was, in effect, replaced.36 Finally, in
1940, the Conference proposed a Model Power of Sale Foreclosure Act
which apparently had no adoptions.37 The Real Estate Mortgage Act and
the Mechanics' Lien Act were withdrawn by the Conference in 1943.3
History certainly suggested danger ahead regarding the proposed land acts,
but there was a belief that the continuing integration of the national
economy would make things different this time.
B. The Drafting Process
In 1969, the ULTA special drafting committee was appointed39 and the
following year drafting commenced. Professor Dunham, who initially
31. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 459 (1927).
32. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 66 (1943) [hereinafter 1943 NATIONAL CONFERENCE].
33. Id
34. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 50 (1932).
35. Id.
36. See Myron H. Lewis, The Recent 1953 Amendments to the Uniform Mechanics' Lien
Act, FLA. B.J., March 1954, at 99.
37. See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 256 (1940).
38. 1943 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 32, at 68-69.
39. The members of the original committee include: Harold E. Read, chair, Robert
Braucher, professor of law at Harvard Law School, William Campbell, United States District
Court Judge, and attorneys Henry S. Fraser, John F. Hanson, George C. Keely, Ellsworth E.
Lonabaugh, Talbot Rain, Hiroshi Sakai, and William H. Wood.
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served as reporter, recruited the present author as co-reporter.40 As is usual
Conference practice, a large group of advisors representing various industry
groups and consumer representatives were appointed and asked to meet with
the committee.41
The reporters commenced work by using Articles 1, 2 and 9 of the
UCC as a template within which to fit cognate real estate rules. The basic
assumption of the drafters was that the UCC rules should be adopted unless
the difference between real estate and personal property required a different
rule.
In the years from 1970 to 1975, many draft versions of the Act were
prepared and reviewed by the drafting committee. The representatives of
industry and consumer groups were invited to, and attended, Committee
meetings, and offered their comments and suggestions as the drafting
proceeded. The following groups were represented: the American Bar
Association, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the American
Bankers Association, the Center for Responsive Law (a consumer group),
the National Association of Home Builders, the American Land Title
Association, the American Life Convention, the United States Savings and
Loan League, the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, the
American Subcontractor's Association, and the Life Insurance Association
of American. Representatives from the following federal agencies and
instrumentalities also attended committee meetings: Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the
40. Professor Dunham wanted a co-reporter who had Commercial Code experience and
some real estate experience. I had been teaching the Code courses at the University of Illinois
and had also taught the first year property course.
41. These representatives include: Charles Allen (Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.), Alan
L. Austin (Am. Life Convention), Ira L. Burleson (Life Ins. Ass'n of Am.), Thomas Hal
Clarke (Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.), George H. Coffin, III (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.),
A. S. Coan, Jr. (Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders of the United States), Herbert S. Colton (Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders of the United States), Robert Elliot (Dep't of Hous. and Urban
Dev.), Joseph F. Fahey, Jr. (Am. Bankers Ass'n), Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr. (Am. Bar Ass'n),
Raymond A. Jensen (Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am.), Oliver H. Jones (Mortgage Bankers
Ass'n of Am.), Robert Kratovil (Am. Land Title Ass'n), David Krooth, Fairfax Leary (Ctr.
for Responsive Law, Public Interest Research Grp.), George Lefcoe, C. Malcolm Moss (Am.
Life Convention), William D. North (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.), James Pedowitz (Am.
Land Title Ass'n), William Prather (The United States Sav. and Loan League), Robert
Newton Reid (Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n), P. James Riordan (Nat'l Ass'n of Mut. Sav.
Banks), Dan Sheehan (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.), John A. Spanagole, Jr. (Ctr. for
Responsive Law, Pub. Research Grp.), John M. Steinmuller (Life Ins. Ass'n of Am.),
McNeill Stokes (Am. Subcontractors Ass'n), Earl Talbot (Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds.),
Hobart Taylor, Jr., Louis R. Vicenti, and Adolph Zwerner.
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Federal National Mortgage Association.42 As the list of groups suggests,
essentially all relevant perspectives on the law of land transfer and finance
were represented.
It is fair to say that, with the exception of mortgage lenders, federal
agencies included in mortgage lending, and a small number of other
individual advisors, the attitude of the advisors was one of wary caution.
Some were opposed to a uniform law in the area and others were skeptical
of either the need for such an act, or of the willingness of states to accept
it, or both. All, however, wanted to keep an eye on the project to protect
what they perceived as their interests in case the Act was adopted in the
states.
C. The Content of the Acts
1. Article 2 of the ULTA
As noted above, the ULTA was patterned after Articles 2 and 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Therefore, many provisions of the Code were
carried over to the ULTA without change. For example, section 2-202 of
the UCC on the parol evidence rule appeared in the ULTA nearly verbatim
as section 1-306. Section 2-209 of the UCC on contract modification
appeared essentially unchanged as section 1-310 of the ULTA. Other
concepts of the Code such as the right to cure (section 2-508), and the right
to demand assurances (section 2-609), were carried over to the ULTA and
modified to fit land transactions.43 The ULTA, anticipating the later
adoption of Article 2A of the UCC to cover personal property leases,
included leases within the coverage of Article 2 of the ULTA. 4 The Act
also contained express and implied warranty of quality provisions modeled
on those contained in Article 2.15 Under section 2-309:
a seller, other than a lessor in the business of selling real estate,
impliedly warrants that the real estate is suitable for the ordinary uses
of real estate of its type and that any improvements made or contracted
for by [the seller] ... and completed no earlier than 2 years before..
• [the sale of] the contract to convey is made, will be free from
42. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 469.
43. U.L.T.A. §§ 2-305, -403, 13 U.L.A. at 543.
44. Id. art. 2, 13 U.L.A. at 680. In the Act, "real estate" is defined as including the
interest of a landlord or tenant, and Article 2 of the ULTA applies to contracts to convey real
estate. Therefore, leases are contracts to convey real estate under the Act. Id.
45. IaM §§ 2-308, -309, -311, -312, 13 U.L.A. at 531-39.
10451996]
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defective materials; and [is] constructed in accordance with applicable
law, according to sound engineering and construction standards;-and in
a workmanlike manner/ 6
Warranty disclaimers are permitted under rules similar to those of
section 2-316 of the UCC, but with respect to home purchasers (called a
"protected party"):47
no disclaimer of implied warranties of quality in general language or in
the language of the warranty provided in this Act is effective, but a
seller may disclaim liability for a specific defect or failure to comply
with applicable law if the defect or failure entered into and became a
part of the basis of the bargain.48
Under the Act, warranties of quality automatically pass to subsequent
purchasers and disclaimers of warranties are not effective against subsequent
protected party purchasers unless the subsequent party had reason to know
of the disclaimer at the time of purchase. 49 These warranty provisions are
no doubt the most important substantive provisions of Article 2. However,
the warranty provisions were only a little different from the implied
warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes being developed by the
courts during the 1960s and 70s.
In addition to the warranty provisions, Article 2 makes several
significant changes in the remedies rules as they exist in most states. First,
under the ULTA, if a buyer wrongfully rejects, repudiates, or otherwise
materially breaches, so that a seller is excused from conveying to a buyer,
the buyer can recover as damages the difference between the resale price
and the original contract price, if the seller conducts a resale which complies
with the statutory requirements.5 1 However, under the common law in
46. Id. § 2-309, 13 U.L.A. at 533.
47. The definition of protected party is somewhat complex; the term includes those who
buy for close relatives and corporations that buy residences for controlling shareholders, but
excludes real estate of more than three acres, or real estate which contains more than four
dwelling units, or which contains non-residential units for which the protected party is a
lessor. U.L.T.A. § 1-203, 13 U.L.A. at 490-92.
48. Id. § 2-311(c), 13 U.L.A. at 536.
49. Id. § 2-312(c), 13 U.L.A. at 538. The subsection further provides that the
subsequent purchaser has reason to know of a disclaimer if it appears in the recorded deed
in the original transaction.
50. E.F. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did
It, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 835 (1967).
51. U.L.T.A. § 2-504, 13 U.L.A. at 552.
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most states, a seller's remedy for buyer's breach is a recovery of the
difference between the contract price and the market price, and the actual
resale price is only evidence of the market price. 2 Second, under the law
in many states "earnest money" deposits made by a buyer can, on breach by
the buyer, be retained by the seller without proof of actual damages or a
valid liquidated damages clause. Under the Act, such amounts must be
returned to the breaching buyer unless they can be retained under a valid
liquidated damages clause or the seller proves actual damages. 3 Third, the
Act rejects the merger by deed doctrine under which a buyer who accepts
a deed of conveyance is treated as having waived any rights he had under
the contract of conveyance if they are not repeated in the deed.' Under
the merger by deed doctrine, if, for example, a seller promised to convey
fifty acres and the buyer accepted a deed conveying only forty, the buyer
would be precluded from asserting a breach based on the shortage in
acreage." Fourth, an unconscionability section, similar to section 2-301
of the UCC, is included. 6
The Act also liberalized the requirements for enforcing contracts with
incomplete terms by providing that a contract of sale could be enforced even
though the price was not fixed, or other terms were missing, so long as the
court could provide an appropriate remedy." The Act also contains a
modem statute of frauds which provides a new start for judicial interpreta-
tion, replacing the 300 year accretion of cases and qualifying rules under the
original real estate statute of frauds in effect in most states.5 ' There are
also other, more modest changes, from the usual common law rules. 9
52. See Zareas v. Smith, 404 A.2d 599 (N.H. 1979).
53. U.L.T.A. § 2-516, 13 U.L.A. at 565.
54. Id. § 1-309, 13 U.L.A. at 500.
55. See Weiland v. Bernstein, 192 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1959) (applying the merger by deed
rule in a shortage in acreage situation), rev'd, 210 N.Y.S.2d 916 (App. Div. 1961); see also
McSweyn v. Mussellshell County, 632 P.2d 1095 (Mont. 1981) (applying the merger by deed
doctrine over a dissent which argued that the rule of ULTA should be adopted).
56. U.L.T.A. § 1-311, 13 U.L.A. at 502.
57. 1l §§ 2-202, -203, 13 U.L.A. at 514-16.
58. kL § 2-201, 13 U.L.A. at 512; see ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 355-
433 (1952) (devoting 98 pages to a discussion of the original real estate statute of frauds).
The original English statute of frauds was adopted in 1677 and all states except Louisiana,
Maryland, and New Mexico have adopted a statute similar to the English statute. Maryland
and New Mexico have treated the English statute as a part of their common law. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS 281-83 statutory notes (1977).
59. For example, under § 2-302, form contract provisions reading "time is of the
essence" are not sufficient to effectively provide that failure to perform on the specified day
is a material breach.
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2. Article 3 of the ULTA and ULSIA
Article 3 of the ULTA (and the ULSIA) is patterned after Article 9 of
the UCC. Because of major differences in the issues which arise in
personal property security and in real estate security, there is much less
congruence between the ULSIA sections and those of Article 9 of the UCC,
than there is between UCC Article 2 and ULTA Article 2. However, the
ULSIA adopts the basic terminology of Article 9 of the UCC. The single
term "security agreement" replaces "mortgage," "deed of trust," "contract for
deed," "installment land contract," and other terms for land security devices
in use in various states.6" Also, following Article 9 of the UCC, the
ULSIA applies the same rules to all forms of land security interests.
Therefore, there is no difference in the Act between the rights of the parties
under a mortgage and their rights under an installment land contract or deed
of trust.62 The Act's major changes from existing law are found in the
foreclosure rules.6' However, there were a few significant changes in other
areas, some pro-mortgagee and some pro-mortgagor. One pro-mortgagor
provision allows a mortgagor, after granting the security interest, to enter
into leases which take priority over the mortgage, if the term is not longer
than two years, and a reasonable rent is reserved and is paid quarterly or
more often.64 A pro-mortgagee provision gives the mortgagee a security
interest in: 1) rights which the mortgagor has against a seller for breach of
warranty or other breach; 2) any claim of the mortgagor for payment for
parts of the real estate taken by eminent domain; 3) insurance payable to the
mortgagor because of loss or damage to the real estate; and 4) any claim of
the mortgagor against third parties because of loss or damage to the real
estate.65 ULSIA also contains a provision which clarifies the law regarding
the priority of future advances over intervening parties.66 It repeals any
existing usury statute which applies to commercial loans secured by real
estate, but allows states to set usury rate for consumer transactions. 67
60. As noted earlier, in 1985 the Conference carved out Article 3 of the ULTA as a free
standing act, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"). In the following
discussion, citations will be to the ULSIA and, where there is a difference between ULTA
and ULSIA, the substantive provision referred to will be that of ULSIA.
61. U.L.S.I.A. § 111 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 220, 232 (Supp. 1995).
62. IM § 102(b).
63. See discussion infra accompanying notes 67-75 and 114-121.
64. U.L.S.I.A. § 207, 7A U.L.A. at 24.
65. Id. § 210, 7A U.L.A. at 243.
66. Id § 301, 7A U.L.A. at 245.
67. Id. § 403 alt. B, 7A U.L.A. at 249.
1048 [Vol. 20
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/5
Benfield
By far the most important provisions of the ULSIA are those permitting
a mortgagee (secured party) to foreclose a mortgage (security interest) by
non-judicial sale.6" At the time the ULTA was being drafted, about half
the states permitted non-judicial power of sale foreclosure.69 All those
power of sale states contained a statutorily prescribed method of sale which
typically required an auction sale at some specified place, often the county
courthouse, after a prescribed series of auction announcements in the legal
advertisement section of a local newspaper." The remaining jurisdictions
required a judicial action to foreclose.7 Of the twenty-seven states which
used non-judicial power of sale foreclosure, nine permitted the mortgagee
to redeem after the sale, within periods ranging from seventy-five days to
two years." The ULSIA, as noted, permits private power of sale foreclo-
sure, but under rules very different from those that apply under the power
of sale statutes of most states. The ULSIA, does not set out in detail how
the sale is to be conducted, but, following Article 9, requires only that the
sale be held in a reasonable manner.73 The ULSIA comments say that for
a sale to be made in a reasonable manner, the foreclosing party must to
advertise in the same manner that a seller selling his own property would
advertise.74 The Act also permits sale by private negotiation, which could
include listing the property for sale through a real estate agent. Also, the
ULSIA does not permit redemption after sale.75 The ULSIA denies a
deficiency judgment after foreclosure of purchase money security interests
in homes occupied by the debtor or persons related to the debtor.76
68. Il §§ 505-508, 7A U.L.A. at 255-60.
69. A committee of the section on Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association reported in 1968 that in 27 jurisdictions power of sale was the
usual method of foreclosure. In Maine, the foreclosure method was described as "public
notice" but it seems to have been a non-judicial procedure. See Committee on Mortgage
Law and Practice, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 413, 414 (1968). [hereinafter Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice].
70. GEORGE OSBORNE ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 7.19-.21 (1978).
71. See Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice, supra note 69, at 414.
72. d
73. U.L.S.I.A. § 509(a), 7A U.L.A. at 261. The UCC requires that the sale be
"commercially reasonable." U.C.C. § 9-504. The ULSIA requires only that the sale be
"reasonable." The drafters concluded that the addition of the word "commercially" in the
context of real estate was not helpful.
74. U.L.S.I.A. § 509 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. at 261.
75. U.L.S.I.A. § 513 cmt. 1, 7A U.L.A. at 266.
76. Id § 511(b), 7A U.L.A. at 264; see Id. §§ 111(18), 113-114, 7A U.L.A. at 231, 235-
36 (stating the precise transactions in which the anti-deficiency rule applies).
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The ULSIA provisions on foreclosure are based on the assumption that
it is beneficial to both the creditor and the debtor that foreclosure sales be
efficient, inexpensive, and handled in a manner that is likely to produce as
high a sales price as possible. Judicial foreclosure is expensive and is likely
to result in substantial delay. Power of sale foreclosure, with an auction sale
at the courthouse after advertisement in the legal notices section of a local
newspaper, is not conducive to creating the degree of prospective buyer
interest which a person selling her own land would wish to generate.
Giving the debtor a right to redeem the property for some period after the
foreclosure sale surely depresses the price which a buyer would be willing
to pay since possession and use must be effectively delayed until the end of
the redemption period. The ULSIA drafters believed that the Act's power
of sale provisions would minimize the cost of foreclosure and maximize the
price received.77
Foreclosure procedures which delay the time of foreclosure and periods
of redemption after the sale during which the defaulting mortgagor can
redeem the property (retain possession) are clearly advantageous to
mortgagors who default. In a partial trade-off for taking away from home
mortgagees the advantages of longer foreclosure periods and right of
redemption, the ULSIA denies deficiency judgments to home mortgagees in
the case of purchase money mortgages.78
77. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 470-71.
78. U.L.S.I.A. § 511(b), 7A U.L.A. at 264. Deficiencies are available for foreclosure
of non-purchase money mortgages because lenders may be willing to lend sums in excess of
the value of mortgaged property and there was no wish to discourage that practice.
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The USLTA brings together in a single statute a number of provisions
relating to the land transfer system: priorities,"0 liens against land includ-
ing mechanics' liens,81 recording, 2 lis pendens notice, 3 formal require-
ments for deeds,84 marketable title, 5 and land records.8 6 Other than the
mechanics' lien provisions, there is little in the USLTA that is controversial.
The mechanics' lien article, called Construction Liens in the ULSIA,
is a detailed, relatively complete coverage of liens against real estate on
behalf of persons whose labor or materials go into improvements on real
estate. All states have mechanics lien statutes under which contractors,
subcontractors, and materialmen, even those who did not contract directly
with the owner of the real estate under certain circumstances, have a lien
against the real estate being improved for any part of the price of their work
or materials not paid for by the person with whom they contracted. 7
Under many of those statutes, the priority of the lien dates from commence-
ment of the work, a non-record event.88 Under such systems, a lender or
buyer cannot by a search of the public land records determine whether a
mechanics' lien claim might exist. Also, under many statutes, the lien of an
unpaid subcontractor or materialman attaches to the owner's land even
79. U.S.L.T.A. art. 3, pt. 2, 14 U.L.A. 249, 280-90 (1976) (amended 1977). This very
brief description of the coverage of the USLTA (and the subsequent spin-off, the Uniform
Construction Lien Act) is intended merely to give the reader a basis for understanding the
comments later made regarding the acceptability of the Acts. For fuller discussion of the
substantive provisions of the ULSIA and the UCLA see, among others, the following:
Marion W. Benfield, Jr., The Uniform Construction Lien Act: What, Wither, and Why, 27
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 527 (1992); Peter B. Maggs, Land Records of the Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act, 1981 S. ILL. U. L.J. 491; Taylor Mattis, The Uniform
Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Article 2-Conveyancing and Records, 1981 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 511; Note, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act, Areas of Departure from
State Law, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 359 (1978); Symposium, The Uniform Land Transactions Act
and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Potential Impact on Florida Law, 10
STETSON L. REV. 21 (1980).
80. U.S.L.T.A. art. 3, pt. 2, 14 U.L.A. at 280-90.
81. Id. art. 4, 5, 14 U.L.A. at 302-63.
82. Id. art. 2, pt. 3, 14 U.L.A. at 270-79.
83. Id. art. 4, pt. 3, 14 U.L.A. at 305-08.
84. Id. art. 2, pt. 2, 14 U.L.A. at 266-69.
85. U.S.L.T.A. art. 3, pt. 3, 14 U.L.A. at 290-95.
86. hia art. 6, 14 U.L.A. at 363.
87. See U.C.L.A. prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 330 (Supp. 1995); see also Benfield, supra
note 79, at 527-31.
88. Benfield, supra note 79, at 583 n.102.
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though the owner in good faith, without knowledge of the lien claim, paid
the full price of the improvement to the prime contractor.89 The drafters
of the UCLA concluded that both rules were unfair to owners and third
parties who deal with the land. Therefore, under the UCLA (and Article 5
of ULSIA) an owner is protected to the extent the owner pays the prime
contractor without notice of a lien claim by a subcontractor or material-
man, 90 and the lien claimant's priority against third parties who deal with
the owner dates from the time of a public filing, which indicates that
construction lien claims may exist.9
D. Reasons for Failure of Jurisdictions to Adopt the Land Acts
1. Generally
The drafters assumed that uniformity of land transactions law in the
various states would be beneficial to both parties in real estate transactions,
just as the near universal adoption of the UCC has been beneficial in
personal property transactions. While land does not move, people do, and
mortgage lenders often lend in more than one jurisdiction. Therefore,
uniformity of laws would simplify the operations of persons who have real
estate transactions in various states, and make the law more understandable
for those who move from state to state and buy real property. Further, the
existence of a national secondary mortgage market in which lenders who
generate mortgages can sell them, could make more money available to
finance land, particularly home purchases.92 At the time the ULTA was
being drafted, federal mortgage agencies were supportive of the effort. They
believed that uniformity of law would be beneficial to the further develop-
ment of a national secondary market in mortgages.93 Particularly, it was
believed differences in losses on mortgage foreclosure arising out of
differences in state laws would make underwriting of mortgages in different
89. Id. at 540 n.72.
90. U.C.L.A. § 207 alt. A, 7 U.L.A. at 348. There is a slightly less owner-protective
alternative offered to the states under which a subcontractor or materialman has a lien claim
against the owner for goods or services rendered within 20 days before he notifies the owner.
Id. § 207 alt. B, 7 U.L.A. at 351.
91. Id. § 208(b), 7 U.L.A. at 353.
92. See U.L.T.A. prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. at 469; see also U.L.S.I.A. prefatory note,
7A U.L.A. at 220.
93. See James E. Murray, The Proposed Uniform Land Transactions Act, 7 REAL
ESTATE REV. 64 (1977). At the time he wrote the article, Mr. Murray was Senior Vice-
President and General Counsel of the Federal National Mortgage Association.
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states difficult, and would discourage lenders from lending in states with
unfamiliar foreclosure laws. Similarly, it was believed that secondary
market participants would be discouraged from buying mortgages from
states whose laws were unfamiliar.
9 4
However, after the acts were promulgated, no significant support
appeared for uniformity in land transactions law. Banks and other lenders
apparently did not consider uniformity sufficiently important to urge
adoption of the ULTA, even though the substantive provisions of the ULTA
could hardly have been viewed as harmful to lenders. In fact, nationaliza-
tion of the mortgage market occurred rapidly beginning in the 70s, without
the benefit of uniform real estate law.
Secondary mortgage market activity exploded during this period. From
1970 to 1984, the proportion of all fixed rate residential mortgage loans
sold through the secondary market increased from 32% to 61%. In the
early 1980s less than 5% of all newly originated, conforming conven-
tional fixed rate home mortgage loans were securitized. This proportion
increased to over one-half by 1987.' 5
Therefore, it appears that lack of uniformity is not a substantial
impediment to a national mortgage market. Further, it can be argued,
though this author does not agree, that the differences in economic, social,
and political conditions in the various states are so substantial that uniform
real estate transactions law in all of them would be bad public policy, and
that the costs of non-uniformity are trivial.96
In any event, no ground swell for uniformity developed, though some
lawyers continue to stress uniformity as a value to be achieved through the
adoption of, at least, the ULS]A.9 The following discussion of Article 2
of the ULTA, Article 3 of the ULTA-ULSIA, and of the USLTA-UCLA,
focuses on substantive objections to those acts which, in the eyes of many,
made them unacceptable.
94. See U.L.S.I.A. prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 220.
95. Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law
in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261,
1272 (1991) (citations omitted).
96. Michael Schill makes exactly that argument. Id.
97. Geis, supra note 13, at 289.
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2. Article 2 of the ULTA
Many real estate lawyers disagree with a number of the policy choices
made in the Act, including the use of the UCC template for the legislation.
They are reasonably satisfied with existing law, believing that the costs of
learning and applying new law outweigh the benefits to be derived from the
law, and are reasonably satisfied with existing law. Disagreement with
policy choices made in Article 2 of the ULTA is well represented by a
resolution of the Real Property Law Section of the New York Bar Assoc-
iation ("Section") prepared for consideration at a Section meeting on June
19, 1976.98 The resolution proposed that the New York State Bar Associa-
tion vote against approval of ULTA at the American Bar Association's
annual meeting in July, 1976. The Section disagreed with most of the
changes in the law which the drafting committee viewed as desirable
modernization of the law. Some examples follow. The ULTA proposes to
abolish the doctrine of merger by deed.99 The Section rejected abolition
of merger by deed as an erosion of "the certainty which is desirable when
dealing commercially with substantial interests in real estate." 1" The
Section also objected to the revision of the statute of frauds,"1 the grant
to the court of the power to fill in contract terms if there is a reasonable
certain basis for giving a remedy,"° and a provision making options
enforceable without consideration. 3 They also objected to the idea in
the ULTA that warranties of quality would automatically pass to subsequent
purchasers. '1 4
In the years when the ULTA was being adopted, if there was one thing
which nearly all commentators agreed on, it was that the old caveat emptor
rules which had generally been applied to real estate sales, were no longer
appropriate. Therefore, one might have thought that the quality warranty
98. New York State Bar Ass'n, Resolution of Real Property Law Section for Action by
House of Delegates at Its Meeting on June 19, 1976, at 1 (July 21, 1976) (unpublished
resolution, on file with NYSBA, Albany, N.Y.).
99. U.L.T.A. § 2-517, 13 U.L.A. at 566.
100. See New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee to Review the
Uniform Land Transactions Act 5 (July 21, 1976) (unpublished report, on file with NYSBA,
Albany, N.Y.) [hereinafter Committee on ULTA].
101. Id. at 8-9.
102. Id. at 10. "The Committee is shocked that [ULTA] gives a judge the power to fill
in a contract where the parties have omitted terms." Id. The rule in question has been a part
of U.C.C. § 2-204 since its inception and opposition has died away.
103. Id. at 11.
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provisions of the ULTA would be a substantial plus factor leading to enact-
ments. However, adoption of the Act would have merely accelerated a
development which was already in progress in the courts. By the mid-
1970s, a number of courts had abandoned the traditional caveat emptor rule
in real estate sales and had instead imposed a warranty of habitability on
professional sellers of real estate, at least as to new construction.105
Therefore, a proponent of implied warranty liability in sales of real estate
might reasonably have concluded that there was a better chance of rapid
adoption of that rule in the courts, than through attempts to secure the
adoption of the ULTA, 6 or that there was no significant advantage in
adopting the Act to achieve changes which were likely to come in short
order anyway.
The Section was, however, opposed to the warranty of quality
provisions of Article 2 of the ULTA.'" But those favorable to quality
warranties also attacked the Act. Professor John A. Spanogle, speaking on
behalf of the Public Interest Research Group, a consumer oriented research
group, attacked the Article 2 warranty provisions (and the abolition of the
merger doctrine) as not being sufficiently protective of consumers." As
is not uncommon when changes in law are proposed, the ULTA quality
warranties alienated both those representing sellers and those representing
consumer buyers.
Lawyers, particularly, are understandably wary of changes in the law
which render their learning obsolete and which require that they learn new
and unfamiliar concepts with the attendant pain and possibility of error."°
105. Carlyn M. Chittenden, From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Equity-The Implied
Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 571 (1992).
106. As of July 1994, at least 29 states had imposed implied warranties of habitability
or similar warranties on sellers of new homes. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont,
Washington, and Wyoming. See Liability of Builder-Vendor or Other Vendor of New
Dwelling for Loss, Injury, or Damage Caused by Defective Condition Thereof, 25 A.L.R. 3d
383 (1968 & Supp. 1994).
107. Committee on ULTA, supra note 100, at 4.
108. John A. Spanogle, Remarks at the Hearings of the Drafting Committee of the
Uniform Land Transactions Act (Apr. 5, 1975) (transcript available at Nova Law Review).
109.
Rightly or wrongly, there are those who are opposed to any change in the law;
[sic] however, because the existing law is known and understood, and any new
statute will take new learning and new interpretations before it can be relied
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Many lawyers, therefore, no doubt preferred the old land law which they
knew, over the new law which they did not know.
In short, there has been essentially no support for Article 2 of the
ULTA. It is worth noting, however, that the quality warranties of the
ULTA, slightly modified, appear in the Uniform Condominium Act,"' the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,"' the Uniform Planned
Community Act," 2 and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act."
13
3. Article 3 of the ULTA and ULSIA 
4
The key provisions of Article 3 (Security Interests) of the ULTA (and
of the ULSIA) are their provisions on foreclosure. The drafters of the
ULSIA strongly believed that real estate mortgage foreclosure sales should
be reasonably rapid, free from the costs of judicial procedure, and there
should be no right of redemption by the mortgagor after a foreclosure sale.
Also, the drafters believed that foreclosure sales need not be conducted as
auctions with elaborate statutory procedures which effectively withdraw
mortgage foreclosures from the usual real estate market. Therefore, the
ULTA permits mortgages to contain a power of sale clause under which the
foreclosing mortgagee need not institute a judicial proceeding, and there is
no right of redemption by the mortgagor after a foreclosure sale. At the
same time, the mortgagee's obligation is to conduct a reasonable sale using
methods which might be used in the usual, non-foreclosure sale context.
The drafters believed that foreclosing real estate lenders should not be
prevented, by rigid statutory foreclosure rules, from being able to sell in the
upon. This does not mean that any new legislation is to be rejected out of hand,
but it does mean that such new laws or proposed laws must be critically
analyzed, particularly in connection with land law. Land historically has been
so important to our agrarian economy that there is a certainty in that law in most
states that may be lacking in other law.
Stanley B. Balbach, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Articles 1 and 2, 11 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2 (1976).
110. UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §§ 4-113 to -116, 7 U.L.A. 421, 556-563 (1977)
(amended 1980).
111. UNw. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT §§ 4-113 to -116,7 U.L.A. at 270-73
(Supp. 1995).
112. UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT §§ 4-113 to -116, 7B U.L.A 1, 125-130 (1980).
113. MODEL REAL ESTATE COOPERATIVE ACT §§ 4-113 to -116, 7B U.L.A. 225, 330-
336 (1981). As noted earlier, those acts have been adopted in a total of 14 states. See supra
note 11.
114. Recall that in 1985, Article 3 of the ULTA, with some changes, was promulgated
as a separate act, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act.
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way best calculated to secure the same price that a seller, selling on the
seller's own behalf, could achieve. Therefore, the ULSIA encourages
foreclosing sellers to sell through real estate brokers and requires that they
advertise, not just in the legal advertising section of a local newspaper, but
in places in which a real estate seller selling for her own account would
advertise.115
Unfortunately for the prospects of the ULSIA, there is a sharp division
of opinion concerning whether mortgagees should be permitted to foreclose
without judicial supervision." 6 In the early 1970s, about half the states
permitted private power of sale foreclosure, and about half required judicial
foreclosure.1 7 Though there were significant variations among the power
of sale statutes, particularly regarding the time required to complete the sale
and gain possession,1 the time periods in the ULSIA were not sufficient-
ly different from those acts to create a strong incentive for adoption of the
ULSIA provisions in states which already had a power of sale foreclosure.
States which required judicial sale were not likely to be easily convinced
that power of sale was better. 9
The underlying assumption of the ULSIA was that quick, inexpensive
foreclosure procedures translated into lower costs for lenders and therefore,
into lower interest rates, or lower credit standards for borrowers on real
estate collateral. Unfortunately for the prospects for the ULSIA, there are
no good studies which controlled for other variables, and which are able to
document a clear difference in rates between states with long, expensive
foreclosure proceedings and those with short, less expensive procedures."
One analysis suggests that requiring judicial foreclosure and increasing the
time to foreclose by one year would increase mortgage costs (spread over
all home mortgages) by only eighteen basis points." Other studies have
indicated a somewhat higher figure for anti-deficiency legislation and long
(one year or so) periods for mortgagor redemption after sale." In any
115. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
116. Patrick B. Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness
of Iowa's Traditional Preference for Protection Over Credit, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1985);
Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REv. 489
(1991).
117. Bauer, supra note 116, at 3 n.7.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1.
120. See Schill, supra note 116, at 496-500 (discussing some of the studies).
121. Id. at 505.
122. Id. at 496-97. The studies summarized suggest a statutory right of redemption that
delayed by 11 months a buyer's right to possession of property bought on foreclosure would
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event, there are no good studies which show that states which are committed
to judicial sale or long statutory redemption periods after sale, or both, are
imposing significant additional costs on borrowers of that state.
However, in recent years, Congress has passed legislation which
preempts state foreclosure law as to certain Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") insured mortgages, and permits non-judicial sales with no
right of redemption. In 1981, such a statute applicable to multi-family
(apartment) mortgages was passed.1 3 In 1994, the Single Family Mort-
gage Foreclosure Act of 1994,24 which gives HUD the power to foreclose
some HUD related mortgages on single family homes by power of sale with
no right of redemption, was passed. The first section of the 1994 Act states,
that "Congress finds that . . . the disparate State laws under which
mortgages are foreclosed on behalf of the Secretary [of Health and Human
Services] ... increase the costs of collecting obligations; and ... generally
are a detriment to the community in which the properties are located."'
25
Further, the Act states that long redemption periods lead to deterioration in
the condition of the properties involved, necessitate substantial federal
holding expenditures, increase the risk of vandalism and waste of the
properties, and adversely affect the neighborhoods in which the properties
are located.' 26
The justifications for power of sale foreclosure given by Congress are
equally applicable to any foreclosure, but as noted, they have not led to
enactment of the ULSIA, nor in any change in the number of states in
which power of sale foreclosure is available1 27 However, there has been
some reduction in the number of states in which there is no right of
redemption after the foreclosure sale."~ In spite of the reduction in the
increase mortgage costs by 17.42 basis points.
123. See Multi Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 362,
95 Stat. 422 (1981) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3701 (1994)).
124. See Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-327, § 801,
108 Stat. 2316 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3751 (1994)).
125. 12 U.S.C. § 3751(a).
126. Id.
127. Geis, supra note 13, at 321-22. This article lists 33 states in which power of sale
foreclosure is available. The number is based on a state by state summary of foreclosure
laws in SIDNEY A. KEYLES, FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES (1995). However,
an examination of the state summaries in Keyles indicates that of the 33 states with power
of sale statutes, the procedure is not used in seven. The seven are: Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. See generally id.
128. In 1968, a summary of state laws indicated that there was a statutory right of
redemption after foreclosure in 23 states. Committee on Mortgage Law and Practice, supra
note 69, at 414. In 1995, it was reported that 16 states have a statutory right of redemption
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number of states which permit redemption by the mortgagor after the
foreclosure sale, the evidence is that states which have judicial sale and
redemption periods are hesitant to change their law.
In states which already have power of sale statutes, there would be a
relatively small gain from adoption of the ULSIA. The provisions of the
ULSIA permitting foreclosure by private sale, rather than at auction, and
requiring advertisement of the foreclosure sale in the real estate sections of
129newspapers, would probably tend to produce higher prices. However,
many mortgagors would still probably prefer to sell at auction and might
view the uncertainties of the requirement that their sale be "reasonable" to
be a detriment.
Other provisions of ULSIA, such as the right to take possession without
the appointment of a receiver, or the priority rules as to future advances,
might be valuable but law review comments on the non-foreclosure
provisions of ULSIA were mixed. 30
Several years ago, the American College of Real Estate Lawyers Law
Reform Committee, under the leadership of Norman Geis, a Chicago
attorney, undertook to secure adoption of the Uniform Land Security Act in
the various states.' 3 ' The effort lead to substantial studies of the act in
New York, Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon, and other states, but no enact-
ments. 132 Mr. Geis is still actively working for adoption of the ULSIA
and there is a current effort in Minnesota to adopt a modified version of the
ULSIA which may be successful. 33
after the foreclosure sale. Geis, supra note 13, at 321-22.
129. See also supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
130. Several articles have generally favorable discussions of the ULTA, e.g., Jon W.
Bruce, Mortgage Law Reform under the Uniform Land Transactions Act, 64 GEo. L.J. 1245
(1976); James M. Pedowitz, Mortgage Foreclosure under ULSIA (Uniform Land Security
Interest Act), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 495.(1992); George M. Platt, The Uniform Land
Security Interest Act: Vehicle for Reform of Oregon Secured Land Transactions Law, 69 OR.
L. REV. 847 (1990). Contra Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA's Remedies on Default-Worth the
Effort, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1001 (1992); Anthony B. Kuklin, Uniform Land Transactions Act:
Article 3, 11 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 12 (1976).
131. Telephone Interview with Norman Geis, Counsel, Miller, Shakman, Hamilton,
Kurtzon & Schlifke, Chicago, Illinois.
132. See REPORT OF THE ACREL 1990-91 UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY Acms COMMrrrEE
(on file with the Nova Law Review).
133. See Geis, supra note 13, at 314.
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4. The USLTA
The most important part of the Uniform Simplification of Land
Transfers Act is part 5, Construction Liens. As noted earlier, in 1987, the
Uniform Laws Conference promulgated Article 5 of the USLTA as a
freestanding act, the Uniform Construction Lien Act. The rest of this
discussion will consider only mechanics liens. The other provisions of the
USLTA would make modest improvements in the conveyancing and real
estate lien law, but probably not enough to justify the inevitable disruption
caused by a wholesale revision of conveyancing and real estate lien law.'3
All states have acts called mechanics lien acts or construction lien acts,
under which persons who supply labor or materials for specific construction
on real estate can, without the owner's consent, acquire a lien against the
property to secure the money owed to them for their work on the project.
There is much diversity among the states as to exactly which parties get
liens, the extent of the lien, the liability of the owner, the priority of the lien
over third parties, the requirements for perfection of the lien, and the
foreclosure procedures. 35 Therefore, the Construction Lien Act would
have brought order out of chaos, but it would also have changed, more or
less significantly, the law of every state. The huge difference in the laws
of the various states in the mechanics lien area is the result of continual
ferment and change as the different interest groups involved (lenders, sub-
contractors, contractors, and title companies) secure legislation favorable to
the interest group. Therefore, the major impediment to the enactment of the
USLTA is the presence of the construction lien article. Since the political
power of the different interest groups varies from state to state and from
time to time, and since the interest groups are well organized and active, it
would be exceedingly difficult to secure wide enactment of a uniform
version of a construction lien law.136
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has tried to provide some answers to the question of why
the Uniform Land Transactions Act, the Uniform Simplification of Land
134. But see Taylor Mattis, The Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act: Article
2-Conveyancing and Recording, 1981 S. ILL. U. L. J. 511 (arguing that Article 2 of USLTA
would be a valuable change in the law of Illinois and other states).
135. See generally Benfield, supra note 79, at 531-35.
136. In spite of the truth of the comments in the text, the UCLA provisions of USLTA
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Transfers Act, and their spin-offs, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act
and the Uniform Construction Act, have had a total of only one adoption in
the various states. I have suggested that there is no constituency for the
acts. There is no group of buyers or sellers who are natural constituencies
for Article 2 of the ULTA. Buyers and sellers of real estate act in that
capacity so rarely that they are not likely to develop views regarding the
desirability of legal change. Consumer lobbying groups might be thought
to be interested in changes which are more protective of home buyers than
existing law. However, even though there were such provisions in Article
2 of the ULTA, no consumer group support has developed. Other than
consumer groups, the only people likely to be interested in Article 2 are
lawyers, and many lawyers do not agree with the changes in law made by
Article 2, or if they do agree with some changes, they think that the costs
of changing the legal rules outweigh any benefits.
Lenders are a natural constituency for Article 3 of the ULTA and its
spin-off, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act. The drafters believed that
the benefits of uniformity and of a rapid, inexpensive foreclosure process
would cause lenders to be sufficiently interested in adoption of the Act to
lead to an effort to secure adoptions in the various states. That has not
occurred. Perhaps the benefits of uniformity were over-estimated by the
drafters, or perhaps lenders have not yet realized that there are substantial
benefits from uniformity. In any event, a strong national secondary market
for mortgages has developed without the benefit of uniform mortgage laws.
Similarly, lenders who lend in states with expensive, time-consuming
judicial foreclosure of mortgages, have not been sufficiently interested in the
advantages of the ULTA-ULSIA foreclosure system to press for adoption of
one of the Acts. That failure may be due, in part, to the belief that states
with judicial foreclosure so strongly believe in the additional protection it
provides to defaulting mortgagors that change is not likely to be secured in
any event.
The UCLA covers an area in which there are strong competing, even
opposite, interest groups: lenders, owners, contractors, subcontractors, and
materialmen. Presently, mechanics lien laws are diverse, and frequently
changing as one interest group or another convinces a legislature to give it
an advantage. Because of the strong opposing interests, and the varying
attitudes toward those interests in the various states, mechanics' lien law is
a particularly unpromising area for national uniformity.
If the drafters had thought more about the hurdles they faced in
securing enactment of the land acts, they might have initially chosen to
undertake some more modest efforts such as a Uniform Real Estate Quality
Warranty Act or a Uniform Power of Sale Act. The Uniform Commercial
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Code, after all, dealt with areas in which there was previous piece-meal
legislation which could be modernized and unified into a single Code. The
Uniform Sales Act was the precursor to Article 2, the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act to Article 3, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act to Article 7, and the Uniform Conditions Sales
Act to Article 9. There was similar history of uniform codification in the
land area.
Perhaps the continuing efforts to secure enactments of the ULSIA will
eventually bear fruit. Passage of other parts of the land acts package seems
more unlikely. Perhaps, in another thirty years, the Uniform Laws Confer-
ence will return again to law reform and unification in the land area. I hope
someone then reads this article, or they may have "wasted days and wasted
nights."
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